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I want to start by quarrelling with Sir Roger Penrose. In 1990 the Journal of Behavioral and 
Brain Sciences published a large number of peer reviews of his book, The Emperor's New 
Mind. At the end he said in his response:  
All my adverse critics on this topic have jumped to conclusions and, in one way or another, 
have missed the point of what I am trying to say. None seem to have grasped the full import of 
the Gödelian argument. The fault is mine: I should have explained things more clearly. (1) 
I have no quarrel with the first two sentences: but the third, though charitable and courteous, is 
quite untrue. Although there are criticisms which can be levelled against the Gödelian 
argument, most of the critics have not read either of my, or either of Penrose's, expositions 
carefully, and seek to refute arguments we never put forward, or else propose as a fatal 
objection one that had already been considered and countered in our expositions of the 
argument. Hence my title. The Gödelian Argument uses Gödel's theorem to show that minds 
cannot be explained in purely mechanist terms. It has been put forward, in different forms, by 
Gödel himself, by Penrose, and by me.  
Gödel gave the Gibbs lecture on Boxing Day, 1951, twenty years after he had discovered his 
theorem, to an audience in the United States, but the lecture was not published or much known 
about, until after his death. It appeared in the third volume of his Collected Works, which was 
published in 1995. I read a paper, "Minds, Machines and Gödel" to the Oxford Philosophical 
Society on October, 30th, 1959, which was subsequently published in Philosophy, 36, 1961, 
pp.112- 127, and reprinted in Kenneth M. Sayre and Frederick J.Crosson, eds., The Modeling 
of Mind, Notre Dame, 1963, pp. 255-271; and in A. R. Anderson, Minds and Machines, 
Prentice-Hall, 1964, pp. 43-59. In 1970 I published a fuller version in my The Freedom of the 
Will, in which I went in greater detail into objections to the Gödelian argument and how they 
should be answered. Roger Penrose had been thinking about the problem for many years before 
he published his The Emperor's New Clothes in 1989, which attracted much attention. In 1994 
he published Shadows of the Mind in which he countered some of the criticisms that had been 
levelled against the earlier version of the argument. There have been a large number of 
discussions, mostly critical, of both his and my versions of the argument.  
Gödel argues for a disjunction: an Either/Or, with the strong suggestion that the second 
disjunct is untenable, and hence by Modus Tollendo Ponens that the first disjunct must be true.  
So the following disjunctive conclusion is inevitable: Either mathematics is incompletable in 
this sense, that its evident axioms can never be comprised in a finite rule, that is to say, the 
human mind (even within the realm of pure mathematics) infinitely surpasses the powers of 
any finite machine, or else there exist absolutely unsolvable diophantine problems of the type 
specified . . . (2) 
It is clear that Gödel thought the second disjunct false, so that by Modus Tollendo Ponens he 
was implicitly denying that any Turing machine could emulate the powers of the human mind. 
(3) 
Roger Penrose uses not Gödel's theorem itself but one of its corollaries, Turing's theorem, 
which he applies to the whole world-wide activity of all mathematicians put together, and 
claims that their creative activity cannot be completely accounted for by any algorithm, any set 
of rigid rules that a Turing machine could be programmed to follow.  
I used Gödel's theorem itself, and considered only individuals, reasonably numerate (able to 
follow and understand Gödel's theorem) but not professional mathematicians. I did not give a 
direct argument, but rather a schema, a schema of disproof, whereby any claim that a particular 
individual could be adequately represented by a Turing machine could be refuted. My version 
was, designedly, much less formal than the others, partly because I was addressing a not-very-
numerate audience, but chiefly because I was not giving a direct disproof, but rather a schema 
which needed to be adapted to refute the particular case being propounded by the other side. I 
was trying to convey the spirit of disproof, not to dot every i and cross every t, which might 
have worked against one claim but would have failed against others. I also chose, in arguing 
against the thesis that the mind can be represented by a Turing machine, to use Gödel's 
theorem, not Turing's. This was in part because, once again, Gödel's theorem is easier to get the 
flavour of than Turing's theorem, but also because it involves the concept of truth, itself a 
peculiarly mental concept.  
Other differences need to be noted. Gödel was a convinced dualist. He thought it obvious that 
minds were essentially different from, and irreducible to, matter; one reason, perhaps, why he 
did not make more of his argument was that he did not feel the need to refute materialism: why 
waste effort flogging a dead horse? Penrose is a materialist, but thinks that physics needs to be 
radically revised in order to accommodate mental phenomena. Quite apart from this, he 
reckons physics must be developed to account for the phenomenon of the collapse of the psi 
function in quantum mechanics. He hopes to produce a unified theory which will be both a 
non-algorithmic theory of quantum collapse and accommodate the phenomenon of mind. I 
acknowledge the importance of both these problems, but think they are separate. Instead of 
trying to expand physics in order to have a physical theory of mind, I distinguish sharply two 
different types of explanation, the regularity explanations we use to explain natural phenomena 
and the rational explanations we use to justify and explain the actions of rational agents. In that 
sense I am a dualist. I have difficulty with the full-blooded Cartesian dualism of different sorts 
of substance, which was, I think, Gödel's position, and am, as regards substance only a one-
and-a-halfist at most. But, as regards explanation, I am at least a dualist, indeed, a many- times-
more-than-dualist.  
Many objections have been raised against the Gödelian argument. Many AI enthusiasts protest 
that they do not work with Turing machines, and have much more complicated and subtle 
connexionist systems. I do not dispute that, and specifically allowed in my original article that 
we might one day be able to create something of silicon with a mind of its own, just as we are 
able now to procreate carbon based bodies with minds of their own. (4) To those who say I am 
therefore flogging a dead horse, I reply by citing Breuel, who explains  
the reason AI researchers, for practical purposes, adhere to the idea that brains are no more 
than computational devices is not philosophical stubbornness but the fact that no physical 
process is known to exist that can be used to build a device computationally more powerful 
than a Turing machine, and no concrete theories of psychological and cognitive phenomena 
have so far required any recourse to physical mechanisms that were more powerful than a 
Turing machine. (5) 
We are dealing not only with practical attempts to build machines that can insert a collar stud 
or tie a bow tie, but with attempts to understand the workings of the human mind; and then to 
show that one very widely accepted schema of explanation is unavailable is well worth doing.  
A much more serious objection is based on the assumption of consistency that I make. Hilary 
Putnam, when I first put the argument to him in a bar in Princeton, objected that in order to be 
in a position to know that the Gödelian formula was true, one needed to know that the system 
was consistent; he maintained that Gödel's second theorem showed that this was impossible. 
(6) Many other critics have maintained the same:  
Thus the premise that the Gödel sentence is true (and unprovable) cannot be known unless it is 
known that arithmetic is consistent, and no Turing machine can know the latter. So who says 
that humans can know it either: (7) 
Well, Gentzen for a start. He gave a convincing proof of the consistency of Peano Arithmetic 
(the simple arithmetic of the natural numbers), using transfinite induction. What Gödel's 
Second theorem showed was that a system could not be proved to be consistent within itself: 
we cannot prove Peano Arithmetic consistent from the axioms and by means of just the rules of 
Peano Arithmetic, but we can give a consistency proof---a very convincing one---applying 
principles from outside Peano Arithmetic. Such proofs, of course, depend on the wider set of 
principles being consistent, and that assumption can be called into question, the more 
particularly since Russell's pointing out that Frege's set theory was inconsistent. (8) 
These are proper objections, but not insuperable ones. Although by Gödel's second theorem we 
cannot prove the consistency of a formal system within that formal system, we can argue for 
the consistency of a formal system by means of wider considerations. And so when Putnam 
raised his objection, I countered that although a Turing machine could not, without 
inconsistency, prove its own consistency, we could affirm that any plausible representation of a 
mind must be consistent, since minds were selective and were unwilling to assert anything 
whatsoever, which an inconsistent machine will do. I discussed the matter both then and in my 
article and book, (9) but Putnam in his review of Shadows of the Mind in the New York Times 
Book Review (***, p.7) ignores the argument, and says simply:  
Mr Lucas's mistake was to confuse two very different statements that could be called "the 
statement that S is consistent." In particular Mr Lucas confused the colloquial statement that 
the methods of mathematicians use cannot lead to inconsistent results with the very complex 
mathematical statement that would arise if we were to apply Gödel's theorem to a hypothetical 
formalization of these methods.  
But I did not confuse them. I argued in some detail, considering and countering various 
objections that might be put forward, that the two were connected (why else would the word 
"consistent" be applied in each case?), and that if a Turing machine was inconsistent it could 
not be a plausible representation of the mind.  
Since many critics are unaware of the argument, (10) and are unlikely to look back at papers 
published some time ago, it is worth articulating the argument afresh. Here in Oxford in the 
fifth week of Trinity Term it is useful to borrow the terminology of First and Second Public 
Examinations. The Mechanist claims to have a model of the mind. We ask him whether it is 
consistent: if he cannot vouch for its consistency, it fails at the first examination; it just does 
not qualify as a plausible representation, since it does not distinguish those propositions it 
should affirm from those that it should deny, but is prepared to affirm both undiscriminatingly. 
We take the Mechanist seriously only if he will warrant that his purported model of the mind is 
consistent. In that case it passes the First Public Examination, but comes down at the Second, 
because knowing that it is consistent, we know that its Gödelian formula is true, which it 
cannot itself produce as true. More succinctly, we can, if a Mechanist presents us with a system 
that he claims is a model of the mind, ask him simply whether or not it can prove its Gödelian 
formula (according to some system of Gödel numbering). If he says it can, we know that it is 
inconsistent, and would be equally able to prove that 2 and 2 make 5, or that 0=1, and we waste 
little time on examining it. If, however, he acknowledges that the system cannot prove its 
Gödelian formula, then we know it is consistent, since it cannot prove every well-formed 
formula, and knowing that it is consistent, know also that its Gödelian formula is true.  
In this formulation we have, essentially, a dialogue between the Mechanist and the Mentalist, 
as we may call him, with the Mechanist claiming to be able to produce a mechanist model of 
the Mentalist's mind, and the Mentalist being able to refute each particular instance offered. 
Many critics have failed to note the dialectical character of the argument, and have rushed in to 
show that the Mentalist is not in all respects superior to all minds, but has his own limitations, 
and can often be beaten by a mind. But if only they had turned over the page, they would have 
seen that I acknowledged as much, and was not making a general claim of superiority, but only 
a particular one of some difference in each particular case. Other critics try to avoid the 
dangerous dialogue by having the mechanist not show his hand. (11) He does not tell us which 
precise model of Turing machine represents a particular mind, nor whether or not the purported 
mechanist model is consistent; and raises the question whether I, or any human mind, could 
really fathom the immense complexity of a representation of a human brain. But then why 
should I? It is for the Mechanist to make good his case. I cannot be just an abstract idea of a 
turing machine, a generalised Turing machine, I know not what. I must be a particular definite 
machine. Although Benacerraf may plead ignorance, it must in principle be knowable which 
machine it is that purports to represent me, and whether it is consistent. And then the argument 
proceeds.  
But still, it may be objected, the Turing machine will be fiendishly complicated. Presented with 
an enormous printout of gobbledygok, how could I make out what it meant, or what its 
Gödelian formula was? But it does not have to me just me. As Michael Dummett pointed out 
when I read the original paper to the Oxford Philosophical Society, I could be helped, indeed 
helped by all the mathematicians in the world, who might be keen to see a mind, even mine, 
defeat mechanism. (In this point there is a similarity with Penrose's argument, which is 
concerned with the output of the entire community of working mathematicians.) Also, now, of 
course, I could be helped by computers. Not everything has to be in machine code: we can 
have programs to translate into higher-level, more transparent languages. It would, admittedly, 
still be difficult to identify all the transformation rules, all the inferences that the machine 
could make, all its initial assumptions, but not impossibly so, if the mind really were a 
machine, and really did proceed according to some algorithmic rules. And once we had done 
this, and chosen some suitable scheme of Gödel numbering, we could set about calculating 
what the Gödelian formula for that system under that scheme of Gödel numbering must be.  
But, it is sometimes further objected, in order to be confident that I can always calculate the 
Gödelian formula, I must have an algorithm to do it by, in which case a machine could be 
programmed to do it too. (12) But this is not so. It is easiest seen if we pursue a criticism of I.J. 
Good, who pressed home an objection I had countered, that the Mechanist might incorporate a 
Gödelizing operator, which indeed he could, but at the cost of making the machine a different 
machine and hence with a different Gödel formula. But the move could be iterated, and though 
at each stage the machine would be different, we should be engaged in a game of catch-as-
catch-can in the transfinite ordinals. (13) And there is no algorithm for naming the transfinite 
ordinals. (14) Every now and again we run out of existing names, and have to devise 
something new. I claim that this is something we can be confident of doing. My critics claim 
that I am being over-confident, and that only if there were an algorithm would I be justified in 
maintaining that I always could go on, and there is no such algorithm. But, say I, we do not 
have to have an algorithm; when we run out of standard names of transfinite ordinals, we 
invent new ones, not according to some rule but by the exercise of ingenuity. And, more 
generally, once we have got the hang of the Gödelian argument, we can adapt it as necessary to 
the needs of the particular case, and can go on producing appropriate Gödelian formulae, 
improvising as necessary when the going is not entirely straightforward.  
At this stage the importance of originality and creativity begins to emerge. What I have offered 
is not one knock-down argument but a schema of refutation, which can be seen to work in 
some cases, but needs adaptation to the particular case. When we consider not a particular case, 
but all possible cases, I cannot offer a single, all-sweeping argument, but only an approach, 
relying on the mind's ability to improvise as needed in new circumstance. It is a difficult 
schema of argumentation, and critics often try to reconstrue it as if it were a single all-
encompassing argument, and then find their reconstruction faulty. In spite of my specific 
disclaimer, (15) they suppose that I am trying to prove that the mind is better than all 
computers taken together. And then it is easy to point out that anything I do can be simulated 
by a computer suitably programmed. (16) All I can do is to repeat my original argument, that I 
do not claim to be better than all computers, but can show for each particular one that I am 
different from it. It is the Mechanist's claim that is being evaluated, and can be outwitted in 
each particular case and shown by the mind it claims to represent, to be an inadequate 
representation of that very mind. (17) 
The argument bifurcates. The Mechanists refuse to acknowledge any originality of the mind. 
And I cannot make them. If the only thing that will budge the Mechanists is a rule-governed 
inference which cannot be resisted on pain of inconsistency, then they cannot be made to see 
the general applicability of Gödelian arguments. All that can be done is to refute each and 
every particular claim they put forward. But their obduracy is unappealing. Once we get the 
hang of the Gödelian argument, we see that it will be applicable in all cases, though its mode of 
application will have to be altered to fit each case individually. There is a way of arguing that 
commends itself to those possessed of minds, who get the hang of the Gödelian argument, and 
twig that they can apply it, suitably adapted, in each and every case that crops up. Mechanists 
may refuse to see the general case, and, acknowledging only knock-down arguments, will have 
to be knocked down each time they put forward a detailed case: minds can generalise, and will 
realise that defeat for the Mechanists is always inevitable.  
The originality required of the mind is not very great, and it may still be objected that the 
Gödelian argument has not done much to vindicate real creativity in the face of sceptical doubt. 
So far as the argument thus far adduced, it is a fair complaint. All that has been achieved so far 
is to ``defeat the defeaters''; a line of argument, supposedly supported by the success of 
science, which would lead to a reductionist view of the mind, and the elimination of all 
originality, has been defeated. We no longer have to think of the mind as an essentially dull 
automaton, but may still observe that many minds are nonetheless somewhat dull, not to say 
boring. The Gödelian argument may refute mechanism, but leaves the woodenness of ordinary, 
uninspired human life untouched. (18) But, although Gödel cannot make us scintillate, he does 
show that scintillation is conceptually possible. He shows us that to be reasonable is not 
necessarily to be rule-governed, and that actions not governed by rules are not necessarily 
random. Many thinkers have thought otherwise, because they supposed that rational actions 
and decisions were so because they were in conformity with some explicit or implicit rule. 
Even great creative artists have a style peculiarly their own, and it is natural to think that their 
style is characterized by some finite description, with some parameters left undetermined, and 
that random choices of these parameters is what produces different masterpiece of the artist's 
oeuvre. But this need not be so: the disjunction between the random variation and the finished 
specification is not exhaustive. For in the case of First-order Peano Arithmetic there are 
Gödelian formulae (many, in fact infinitely many, one for each system of coding) which are 
not assigned truth-values by the rules of the system, and which could therefore be assigned 
either TRUE or FALSE, each such assignment yielding a logically possible, consistent system. 
These systems are random vaunts, all satisfying the core description of Peano Arithmetic. But 
among them there is one, the one that assigns TRUE to all the Gödelian formulae which is 
reasonable, characterizing standard arithmetic, although not more in accordance with the 
specification of Peano Arithmetic than any of the others. So there is some sort of 
reasonableness, pocking out this one instantiation of the specification in preference to all the 
others which is reasonable and right, though not any more in accordance with the antecedently 
formulated rules than any other instantiation.  
The critic may still complain that doing arithmetic in non-non-standard models is still a pretty 
boring activity; but that is not the point. Gödel's theorem shows that there is conceptual room 
for creativity, by allowing that to be reasonable is not necessarily to be in accordance with a 
rule. We can see how it works out with the style of great creative artists. Titian, or Bach, or 
Shakespeare, develop a style which is peculiarly their own, and which we can learn to 
recognise. But it is not static. Up to a point they can produce works that are variations on a 
theme, but beyond that point we begin to criticize, and say that they are painting, composing, 
or writing, according to a formula; it is the mark of second-rate artists to be content to go on 
doing just that, but the genius is not content to rest on his laurels, but seeks to go further, and 
innovate, breaking out of the mould that his previous style was coming to constitute for him. 
Instead of there just being a formula to which all his work conformed, he produces work which 
differs in some significant respect from what he had been doing, and this difference is not just 
a random one, but one which ex post facto we recognise as essentially right, even though it was 
not required by the previous specification of his style. (19) Thus, though the Gödelian formula 
is not a very interesting formula to enunciate, the Gödelian argument argues strongly for 
creativity, first in ruling out any reductionist account of the mind that would show us to be, au 
fond, necessarily unoriginal automata, and secondly by proving that the conceptual space exists 
in which it intelligible to speak of someone's being creative, without having to hold that he 
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